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RULE 615 - BEYOND THE WALLS OF THE
COURTROOM PROPER: EFFICACIOUS TRUTHSEEKING DEVICE OR TOOTHLESS TIGER?
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of separating witnesses is perhaps the most ancient
truth-seeking device extant in the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence.1 Witness sequestration "already had in English practice an independent and continuous existence, even in the time of those earlier modes
of trial which preceded the jury and were part of our inheritance of the
common Germanic law."2 The earliest known record of sequestration in an
English court dates back to the beginning of the fourteenth century, but the
story of Susana, which is recorded in the Apocrypha, demonstrates that
ancient peoples recognized the utility of the practice thousands of years
prior to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Susana's tribal elders accused
her of adultery, and at her trial two witnesses testified that they saw her
lying beneath a certain tree with a man who was not her husband.4 The
elders believed the witnesses' uncontroverted testimony and condemned
Susana to death.5 Daniel, however, intervened on behalf of Susana and
asked the elder to remove one of the witnesses so that he could question
each separately.6 The first man testified that he observed Susana engage in
an adulterous act beneath a mastic tree, and he was then led away and the
second witness was brought in. 7 The second man testified that he witnessed the same adulterous act, but claimed that it transpired in the shade
of an evergreen oak rather than a mastic tree. The discrepancy in the witnesses' accounts of the alleged incident shook the elders' confidence in9 the
veracity of their testimony and consequently they spared Susana' s life.

1 See 6 J. WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE §

1837, 348 (3d ed. 1940) (discussing origins of

witness sequestration).
2 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (quoting WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1837, 348 (3d ed. 1940)).
3 See Frideres v. Schlitz, 150 F.R.D. 153, 158 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (recounting biblical
tale of Susana).
4 See Daniel 13: 36-64 (King James).
5 id.
6 id.
7 id.
Id.
9 Id.
8
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The practice of separating witnesses exists substantially the same
today as it did in Daniel's time.10 This ancient practice finds contemporary
expression in Federal Rule of Evidence 615.11 The aim of the longstanding practice of sequestration which Rule 615 embodies is twofold: it
endeavors to thwart efforts by later witnesses to tailor their testimony to
that of earlier witnesses; and to aid the fact finder in detecting false testimony that has already been given. 12
Currently, several Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree as to the scope
of a sequestration order issued pursuant to Rule 615.13 According to one
strand of authority, Rule 615 requires only that witnesses be physically
excluded from the courtroom and does not proscribe communication between witnesses outside the courtroom proper.' 4 A number of courts, however, have interpreted the rule more broadly.' 5 These courts have interpreted the rule as implicitly barring conduct outside the courtroom that

10 See Gregory M. Taube, The Rule of Sequestration in Alabama: A Proposal for

Application Beyond the Courtroom, 47 ALA. L. REv. 177, 178-79 (1995) (discussing historical origins of witness sequestration).
" The rule states:
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own
motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (i) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is
shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause, or (4) a
person authorized by statute to be present.
FED. R. EvID. 615.
12 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (articulating two-fold purpose
of sequestering trial witnesses).
13 Compare United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
Rule 615 does not apply to communications outside the courtroom), and United States v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1978) (concluding bare Rule 615 sequestration order
only requires exclusion from courtroom proper), with United States v. McMahon, 104 F.3d
638, 643 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that absent specific instructions Rule 615 does
not proscribe communications outside courtroom), and Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc.,
650 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding expert witness who read transcripted trial
testimony violated Rule 615).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
bare sequestration order does not extend beyond the courtroom proper); United States v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding sequestered witnesses may communicate outside courtroom absent specific contrary instructions); United States v. Feola, 651 F.
Supp. 1068, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd without opinion, 875 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1989)
(ruling sequestered witnesses are free to discuss their testimony outside courtroom).
15 See e.g., United States v. McMahon, 104 F.3d 638, 643 (4th Cir. 1997); Clarksville-Montgomery School Sys. v. United States Gypsum Co., 925 F.2d 993, 1002-03 (6th
Cir. 1991); Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981).

RULE 615: BEYOND COURTROOM PROPER'S WALLS
circumvents the spirit and purpose of the rule. 16 Thus far the Supreme
Court has declined to resolve the thorny issue of whether Rule 615 applies
to conduct outside the courtroom proper that may act to frustrate the purpose of the rule.' 7
This Note asserts that courts should interpret Rule 615 broadly in
accordance with the latter view, as opposed to narrowly in accordance with
the former. Part II of this Note examines the text of Rule 615 and the mechanics of its invocation. 18 Part III addresses the circuit split on the scope
of Rule 615 and outlines examples of conduct outside the courtroom that
courts have found violative of sequestration orders.' 9 Part IV briefly explores the possibility of amending Rule 615.20 Finally, Part V argues in
favor of a Supreme Court interpretation Rule 615 that would comport with
the aforementioned broad interpretation. 21 The Court should resolve the
uncertainty as to whether Rule 615 applies beyond the walls of the courtroom in order to insure that rule is uniformly applied in a manner that is
true to its spirit and purpose.
II. RULE 615 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. The Purpose of the Rule
Rule 615 empowers a trial judge to exclude witnesses the courtroom
22
in order to prevent them from hearing the testimony of other witnesses.
An exclusion order issued pursuant to the rule is termed a sequestration
order, and an excluded witness is referred to as "sequestered. ,23 Trial
courts issue sequestration orders to promote two closely related objectives:
preventing fabrication and detecting fabrication that has already occurred.24
The rule promotes its prophylactic aim by preventing witnesses from tailoring their testimony to conform to testimony they have heard presented
by other witnesses.25 Moreover, if witnesses are sequestered pursuant to
16 See

id.

17 Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1223 (1994).
18 See infra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.

19 See infra notes 39-113 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 124-163 and accompanying text.
22 See supra note 11; see also infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing
sequestration as a matter of right).
23 See United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1986).
24 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (articulating two-fold goal of
Rule 615); see also United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1076 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
25 See Geders, 425 U.S. at 87 (explaining exclusion prevents witnesses from tailoring
testimony to match already presented testimony); see also United States v. Shurn, 849 F.2d
1090, 1094 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Perry, 815 F.2d 1100, 1105-06 (7th Cir. 1987);
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the rule and yet elicit uncannily similar testimony, the factfinder may infer
that the similarity is the result of coaching, collusion, or memorization.2 6
B. How the Rule Deviatesfrom its Common Law Predecessor
Subject to the four enumerated exceptions, Rule 615 gives a party
the right to request the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom. 27 In
relevant part the rule reads, "at the request of a party the court shall order
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses."2 8 Prior to the enactment of Rule 615, the decision to grant a
party's request to exclude a witness from a federal courtroom lay solely
within the discretion of the trial judge.2 9 Congress' inclusion of the mandatory language "shall" in the first sentence of the rule, however, stripped
trial judges of the discretion they had under the common law and provided
for the exclusion of witnesses as a matter of right.30 The trial court, however, retains the discretion to exclude witnesses on its own motion that it
enjoyed before the adoption of the rule. 3 But, a party who fails to make a
timely request for the exclusion of a witness cannot later complain about
the trial judge's failure to issue a sequestration order.32
C. When the Rule Applies
Although courts generally agree that the rule is only available in
proceedings involving the testimony of multiple witnesses, there is widespread disagreement as to precisely which stages of a trial the rule ap-

United States v. Farnham, 791 F.2d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 1986).
26 See Perry 815 F.2d at 1105-06 (stating excluding witnesses helps uncover testimony that is not candid).
27 See supra note 11 (reciting text of Rule 615).
28 FED.R.EvID. 615.
29 See Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding court's
discretionary power includes ability to sequester witnesses). See generally JOHN H.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1839, at 467-68 (Chadboum rev. ed. 1976) (explaining common law did not provide for sequestration of witnesses as matter of right).
30 United States v. Johnston, 578 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1978) (explaining how
enactment of Rule 615 changed the common law); see, e.g., United States v. Farnham, 791
F.2d 331, 334-35 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding witness exclusion pursuant to timely Rule 615
request is mandatory); Holman v. Dale Electronic, Inc., 752 F.2d 311, 313 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1076 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Sanford v. CBS,
Inc., 594 F. Supp. 713, 716-717 (N.D. III. 1984).
31 See United States v. Abbott, 30 F.3d 71, 73 (7th Cir. 1994) (trial court issued sequestration order without request from defendant).
32 See id. (holding defendant waived right to complain about court's failure to issue
sequestration order by neglecting to request one).
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plies.33 For example, there is authority that Rule 615 does not permit a
party to request the exclusion of a witness before opposing counsel's opening argument, but there is authority to the contrary as well.34 Those against
allowing courts to apply the rule to opening statements argue that, by its
own terms, Rule 615 relates solely to times when testimony is being given
by other witnesses.3 5
Similarly, some courts have held that the rule authorizes the exclusion of witnesses during closing arguments, while others disagree.36 Since
attorneys frequently restate witnesses' testimony during their closing arguments, in the event of a second trial, witnesses present during the closing
arguments of the first trial might learn of the testimony of other witnesses
and be tempted to reshape their own testimony accordingly.37 The counter
argument is that the text of the rule states that it only applies during witnesses' testimony and as of the time of closing arguments all witnesses
have concluded their testimony.3 8
III. THE SCOPE OF RULE 615 EXCLUSION
Common law sequestration orders not only required witnesses to be
physically excluded from the courtroom while other witnesses were testifying, but also forbade witnesses from discussing their testimony with one
another outside the four walls of the courtroom.39 Currently, a split exists
33 See Feola, 651 F. Supp. at 1130 (holding rule does not apply when witnesses not
testifying) (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 860-61 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (deciding Rule 615 is not applicable during closing arguments); United States v.
West, 607 F.2d 300, 305-06 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36, 37 (3d
Cir. 1976) (concluding rule does not apply to opening arguments); Hamel v. General Motors Corp., No. 86-4388-R, 1990 WL 7490, at *8-9 (D. Kan. Jan. 9, 1990).
34 Compare United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1976) (concluding Rule
615 inapplicable to opening statements), with Queen v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Authority, 842 F.2d 476, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding Rule 615 is applicable to opening arguments).
35 See Brown, 547 F.2d at 38 (explaining why Rule 615 not applicable to opening
statements).
36 Compare United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267, 281 (5th Cir. 1979) (deciding rule
permits trial judge to exclude witnesses during closing arguments), and United States v.
Zuniga-Rosales, Nos. 92-10399, 92-10556, 92-10618, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 27606, at
*14-15 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1993), with United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 860-61 (11 th
Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985), 482 U.S. 908 (1987) (holding rule inapplicable during closing arguments because all witness testimony has already concluded).
37 See Juarez, 573 F.2d at 281 (explaining failure to exclude witnesses from closing
arguments might jeopardize fairness of second trial); see also Zuniga-Rosales, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27606, at *14-15.
38 See Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 860-61 (declaring rule does not apply to closing arguments because all testimony has already concluded).
39 See Taube, supra note 10 at 198 (documenting historical sequestration practices of
several states); see also United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1175-76 (1st Cir. 1993)
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among the circuits as to the scope of Rule 615 sequestration orders. According to one view, Rule 615 is limited by its own terms to the exclusion
of witnesses from the courtroom proper. 40 Another strand of authority,
however, interprets Rule 615 more broadly; these courts argue that rule
should read as implicitly barring conduct outside the courtroom that is intended to circumvent the purpose of the rule.4'
A. Rule 615 Requires Only Physical Exclusion from Courtroom
Rule 615 explicitly refers only to the exclusion of witnesses from
the courtroom, and a number of courts have refused to extend the rule beyond the narrow import of its text.42 While these courts acknowledge that
a trial judge has the discretion to issue orders proscribing conduct outside
the courtroom, such as reading trial transcripts and discussing witness tes43
timony, they maintain that the rule itself does not proscribe such conduct.
In United States v. Sepulveda,44 a First Circuit Court of Appeals
case, the appellants argued that the government's decision to house of three
of its key witnesses in the same jail cell throughout the course of the trial
was a clear violation of the district court's sequestration order.45 The circuit court roundly rejected the appellants' claim that the witnesses' cohabitation violated Rule 615 .46 The court explained that although the rule
closely tracks its common-law predecessor, "it is at once less discretionary
and less stringent than its forebears. ' ' 7 According to the court's interpretation, it is less discretionary than the common law in that it provides for the
exclusion of witnesses as a matter of right, yet less stringent in that it does
not provide for sequestration beyond the courtroom.48 "In sum, the rule
(explaining how Rule 615 differs from its common law predecessor). Rule 615 only requires courts to exclude witnesses from the courtroom proper, but it provides for sequestration as a matter of right. See id. Whereas the common law of sequestration forbade witnesses from communicating outside the courtroom, but afforded judges the discretion to
refuse to issue a sequestration order. See id.
40 See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text (examining case limiting bare sequestration order to courtroom proper).
41 See infra notes 71-113 and accompanying text (discussing cases extending Rule
615 to reach conduct outside of courtroom).
42 See supra note II and accompanying text (setting forth text of
rule).
43 See infra notes 44-65 and accompanying text (documenting narrow interpretations
of Rule 615).
44 15F.3d 1161 (lstCir. 1993).
41 See id.
46 See id. at 1176-77 (holding Rule 615 only applies to communications in the courtroom proper).
47Id. at 1175.
48 See id. at 1175-76 (explaining how adoption of Rule 615 deviates from common
law of sequestration).
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demarcates a compact procedural heartland, but leaves appreciable room
for judicial innovation beyond the perimeters of that which the rule explicitly requires." 49 The court acknowledged that in practice trial judges frequently fashion sequestration orders that forbid witnesses from discussing
testimony outside the walls of the courtroom, but cautioned that inclusion
of such supplemental
provisions is solely a matter for the trial judge's
5
discretion. P
The appellants cited United States v. Greschner51 in support of the
proposition that Rule 615 sequestration orders apply beyond the walls of
the courtroom.52 The court explained that at first blush Greschner may
appear to support appellant's argument, but upon closer inspection the
Greschner court actually agrees with the First Circuit's narrow interpretation of Rule 615.53 Because although Greschnerdid equate "circumvention" of the rule with actual violation of the rule, it nevertheless conceded
that controlling such circumvention lay solely within the discretion of the
district court.
Along these same lines, the earlier First Circuit case of United
States v. Arruda,5 5 which was cited in Sepulveda, agreed that standard Rule
615 sequestration orders do not reach conduct outside the courtroom. 56 In
Arruda the trial judge issued the baseline Rule 615 sequestration order
instructing all witnesses to remain outside the courtroom during trial.57
Two of the government's chief witnesses met outside the courtroom to
discuss testimony during trial, but the court held that this meeting did not
technically violate its sequestration order.58 The trial judge, nevertheless,
decided to treat the witnesses' meetings as a breach of a court order be49 Id. at 1176.
50 Id. "Indeed, such non-discussion orders are generally thought to be a standard
concomitant of basic sequestration fare, serving to fortify the protections offered by Rule
615." But see United States v. Magana, 127 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1997). The trial judge
granted the defendant's oral sequestration motion "without elaborating on the terms of the
order." Id. The prosecutor subsequently conferred with a testifying witness who had not
been excused from the witness stand. Id. Shortly thereafter, the trial judge informed the
prosecutor that pursuant to local custom sequestration orders prohibit attorneys from conferring with testifying witnesses. Id. Although the order had been given in its barest form
and the prosecutor was unfamiliar with the custom, the judge found that he violated the
order nonetheless. Id. In response to the violation, the judge ordered the portion of the
witness' that was elicited after the conferral stricken. Id.
"' 802 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987).
52 See id.
53 See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1176 (denying Greschner stands for proposition that

Rule 615 applies to conduct outside courtroom tending to frustrate purpose of rule).
54 See id. (citing Greschner,802 F.2d at 375-76 and finding it inopposite).
" 715 F.2d 671 (lst Cir. 1983).
56 See id.
57 See id. at 678, 684 (granting sequestration motion in its simplest aspect).
58 See id. (agreeing with government that conduct outside courtroom does not technically violate basic Rule 615 sequestration orders).
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cause their conduct had the same effect as a breach of a sequestration order.59 The Circuit court explained that the district court was not required to
treat the witnesses' conduct 6as a violation of the rule, but it was certainly
within its discretion to do so. 0
In United States v. Feola, the Second Circuit narrowly demarcated
the boundaries of Rule 615 .62 In granting the defendant's motion to sequester pursuant to the rule, the court noted that the rule only requires that
witnesses be excluded from the courtroom proper to prevent them from
hearing the testimony of other witnesses.63 The court made it clear that
outside the four walls of the courtroom, witnesses may "speak freely to
anybody and if they do so, may be cross-examined with respect thereto
insofar as may relate to bias or credibility." 64
In United States v. Smith,65 the Eighth Circuit held that Rule 615
does not apply outside the courtroom, unless the trial judge augments the
basic Rule 615 sequestration order with instructions to that effect. 66 In
Smith, a police officer took notes throughout the course of the trial and
later relayed the contents of these notes to government witnesses who had
not yet testified. 67 The trial court, however, decided that the officer's conduct did not violate the rule and the appellate court agreed.68 The circuit
court explained that the trial judge has the discretion to instruct sequestered
witnesses not to discuss their testimony outside the courtroom, but in this
case no such additional instructions were given.69 Moreover, appellant's
counsel failed to request an order specifically prohibiting witnesses from
discussing the trial.7 °

59 See id. (exercising discretion to treat conduct outside the courtroom as a violation
of Rule 615).
60 See id. (describing trial court's decision to treat witnesses' meetings as violative of
sequestration order as "appropriate").
61 See 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But see United States v. Friedman,
854 F.2d 535, 568 (2d Cir. 1988) (acknowledging that reading trial transcripts may violate
Rule 615).
62 See id.

63 See Feola, 651 F. Supp. at 1130.
64 id.
65 See 578 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1978) (limiting Rule 615 sequestration orders to

exclusion of witnesses from courtroom).
66 See id.
67 id.

68 See id. (holding whether witness has violated sequestration order within trial
court's discretion).
69 See id. (refusing to extend bare sequestration order beyond courtroom walls).
70

Id.
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B. Rule 615 Applies to Conduct Outside the CourtroomAs Well
1. Rule 615 Proscribes Reading Transcripts of Trial Testimony
In the Fourth Circuit Case of United States v. McMahon,71 the court
rejected appellant's narrow interpretation of Rule 615.72 The witness had
instructed his secretary to take notes at the trial of his son, who was being
prosecuted for engaging in fraudulent business activities, and later read
these notes of trial testimony prior to testifying.7 3 The witness admitted to
having read the notes, but cited a number of cases, including Sepulveda, as
standing for the proposition that such conduct does not violate a basic Rule
615 sequestration order.74 The court held that none of the authority cited
by appellant supported his view, and affirmed his contempt conviction for
violating a court order.75 The court held that the cases cited by appellant
addressed the narrower issue of whether the trial judge abused his or her
discretion in allowing witnesses who had arguably violated sequestration
orders to testify.76
In Miller v. Universal City Studios Inc.,77 a copyright infringement

case, the Fifth Circuit interpreted a basic Rule 615 sequestration order as
implicitly barring conduct outside the courtroom intended to frustrate its
purpose. 78 The trial judge barred the defendant's literary expert from testifying because defense counsel provided him with a transcribed portion the
plaintiff's testimony after the trial judge had issued a general sequestration
order.79 On appeal, the defendant argued that Rule 615 only explicitly
prohibits witnesses from hearing the testimony of other witnesses, thus
reading of daily copy does not technically violate the rule. 80
71 United States v. McMahon, 104 F.3d 638, 643 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting contention
that absent specific instructions to that effect Rule 615 is not applicable outside courtroom);
see also United States v. Cortina, No. 94-5489, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 44, at *9 (4th Cir.
January 3, 1996) (noting district courts frequently invoke Rule 615 to proscribe communication between witnesses outside courtroom).
72 See id.
73 See McMahon, 104 F.3d at 641-42.
74 See id. at 643. The witness argued that he was free to read daily copy because the
court's bare sequestration order did not specifically instruct him not to do so. See id.
75 See McMahon 104 F.3d at 643 (rejecting authority cited by appellant in support of
his contention that Rule 615 does not apply outside courtroom absent a specific instruction
to that effect).
76 See id. (explaining cited cases did not address breadth of bare sequestration
orders).
17 See 650 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that providing
expert witness
daily copy of trial transcript violates Rule 615).
78 See id.
79 See id. at 1372-73. The court's order, which was issued before trial, did not specifically instruct the sequestered witnesses not to read trial testimony. Id.
80 See id. at 1373. Appellant also argued that expert witnesses are impliedly exempt
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The appellate court, however, disagreed and affirmed the district
court's ruling that defense counsel violated Rule 615.81 The court reasoned
that Rule 615 implicitly bars conduct that is designed to circumvent its
purpose, which is to prevent testimony-shaping. 82 Moreover, the court
explained that the danger of testimony-shaping is magnified where witnesses possess trial transcripts because they "can thoroughly
review and
83
study the transcript in formulating [their] own testimony.,
Similarly, in Clarksville-Montgomery School System v. United
States Gypsum Co.,84 the Sixth Circuit agreed that the defense's expert
witnesses, who reviewed daily trial transcripts prior to testifying, violated
district court's sequestration order.85 After the expert admitted on the
stand that he had read daily transcripts, the trial judge ordered the witness
from the stand and admonished the jury to disregard his testimony.8 6 The
trial judge explained to the jury that, "[d]efense counsel has violated the
rule of the court, sequestering witnesses, by giving this man the testimony
of another witness who has testified. 87 Following the expert's violation of
the sequestration rule, the district court asked plaintiff if it would like to
move for a mistrial, but plaintiff's counsel declined.88 Plaintiff's counsel
did eventually move for a mistrial, but the district court chose to deny the
motion. 89 In the end, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the
plaintiff appealed on the grounds that it had been prejudiced by the expert's testimony. 90 The appellate court agreed that the defense's expert had
violated rule, but held that the trial judge's admonition was sufficiently

from sequestration under the rule pursuant to Rule 703 and that their expert was expressly
exempt from sequestration under subsection (3) of the rule because he was necessary for the
management of the case, but the court rejected each of these arguments as well. Id.
81 See id. at 1373 (holding providing expert witnesses daily copy violates Rule 615).
82 See id.

83 Id. (arguing reading testimony potentially more harmful than hearing it in open

court).

84 925 F.2d 993, 1003 (6th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging bare sequestration order proscribes experts from reading daily copy).
85

See id.

See id. at 1002 (striking offending witness' testimony from record and admonishing jury not to consider it).
87 Id. at 1002 n.19.
88 See id. at 1002 (declining court's invitation for a mistrial because of plaintiff's
desire to resolve case as soon as possible).
89 See id. at 1003 (denying motion on grounds that removing witness from stand,
admonishing jury, and instructing jury that defendant had violated a court order were sufficient sanctions).
90 See id. (suggesting court's admonition insufficient to overcome prejudice caused
by offending expert's testimony).
86
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combated any prejudice that may have resulted from the witness' testimony. 91
In United States v. Jimenez,92 the Eleventh Circuit declared that
Rule 615's prohibition on reading trial transcripts encompasses recorded
testimony from prior trials as well.9 3 In preparing for trial, a government
agent consulted the testimony of a fellow agent given at an earlier mistrial. 94 The government argued that the language of Rule 615 only expressly prohibits the "hearing" of trial testimony, and thus reading transcripted testimony does not violate the rule.95 Furthermore, the government urged that there is a distinction between current trial testimony and
prior trial testimony, and Rule 615 does not forbid witnesses from reading
the latter. 96 The court, however, citing Miller, unequivocally stated that
"there is no difference between reading and hearing trial testimony for
purposes of Rule 615."9' The government's attempt to distinguish between
current and prior trial testimony did not sway the court; the court expressly
rejected the argument that a Rule 615 sequestration order does not bar a
witness from reading testimony from a prior trial.98
2. Rule 615 Prohibits Witnesses From Discussing Their Testimony
In United States v. Binetti,99 the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument
that Rule 615 only applies to the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom.' °° The defense attorney, the defendant, and two witnesses discussed
the trial during a lunchtime recess.'l0 Upon learning of this meeting, the
trial judge informed the jury that the witnesses had violated the sequestra91 See id. (holding district court's denial of motion for a new trial did not amount to
abuse of discretion).
92 780 F.2d 975, 980 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating government witness violated sequestration order by reading testimony from an earlier mistrial).
" See id.
94 See id.
95 See id. at n.7 (noting Rule 615 does not explicitly proscribe reading testimony).
96 See id. at 980 (attempting to draw a distinction between current and prior trial
testimony).
97 Id.; see also supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussing Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981)).
98 See id. (holding Rule 615 bars witnesses from reading all forms of trial testimony).
9 547 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding witnesses who discussed their testimony violated trial judge's sequestration order); see also United States v. Womack, 654
F.2d 1034, 1040-41 (8th Cir. 1981) (assuming without deciding, that two government witnesses who discussed trial testimony violated rule). The trial judge did issue a sequestration
order, but did not specifically instruct the witnesses not to discuss their testimony. Id. at
1040. The court did not reach the issue whether the district court's failure to complement
its sequestration order with non-discussion instructions constituted a violation of Rule 615.
Id.
1ooSee Binetti, 547 F.2d at 269
101 See id.

126

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. X 2005]
tion order and admonished them to weigh the offending witnesses' credibility accordingly. 02 On appeal, the defendant argued that "on its face"
Rule 615 only calls for the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom
proper and that "he was not given the parameters of any expansion of that
scope."'10 3 Evidently, the court was not moved by this argument because it
held that the district court did not err in admonishing the jury that the defense had violated its sequestration order. 1°4
In another Fifth Circuit Case, United States v. Green,105 the court

characterized the district court's failure to instruct witnesses not to discuss
the case as a violation of Rule 615. The prosecution housed approximately
thirty-seven of its witnesses together at a prison facility prior to eliciting
their testimony. °6 Defense counsel suggested that these witnesses were
discussing the substance of their testimony with one another in violation of
the court's sequestration order.' 0 7 In response to defense counsel's concerns, the district court conducted a thorough investigation and found that
the witnesses in question had not discussed their testimony.108 The defendants' moved for a mistrial based on the cohabitating witnesses' violation
of the court's sequestration order.1°9 The court denied the defendants' motion for mistrial because they did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the
witnesses' non-trial related discussions." 10
Following their convictions, the defendants appealed the denial of
their motion for mistrial."' The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the district court's failure to issue non-discussion orders to the prosecution's cohabitating witnesses was in and of itself a violation or Rule 615.112 The
Court, however, upheld the trial judge's ruling in spite of the violation
based on the district court's determination that the witnesses had not actually discussed the trial." 3
'02
103

See id.
Id.

104 See id. (holding trial judge's remedial comment to jurors within court's discretionary power).
105 See United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding trial court's
sequestration order must include instructions not to discuss testimony).
1'0Seeid.

'07 See
108 See
109 See

id.
id.
id.

110 Id. In denying the defendants' motion for failure to show actual harm or prejudice,

the trial court relied on United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1326 (5th Cir. 1983), and
United States v. Bobo, 586 F.2d 355, 366 (5th Cir. 1978). Id. The defendants were ultimately convicted of conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. Id.
"'
See Green, 293 F.3d at 892.
112

See id.

113

See id. (explaining opposing party did not suffer any prejudice as a result of viola-

tion).

RULE 615: BEYOND COURTROOM PROPER'S WALLS
IV. THE PRUDENCE OF AMENDING RULE 615
One possible approach to deterring conduct that is contrary to the
spirit and purpose of the Rule 615 would be for Congress to amend the
rule. Tennessee has adopted a modified version of Rule 615 that expressly
14
proscribes communications intended to circumvent the rule's purpose.
The drafters of the Tennessee rule were of the opinion that the imprecise
language of Federal Rule 615 left room for unscrupulous individuals to
fashion methods to circumvent its purpose. 1 5 The Tennessee Rule requires the trial judge to "order all persons not to disclose by any means to
excluded witnesses any live trial testimony..." 6 By virtue of the heightened specificity of its rule, Tennessee has insured that its judges will not be
haunted by the same questions of interpretation that have dogged the federal judiciary.' 7 At least one other author has cited the language of Tennessee's rule with approbation, and has urged for
the inclusion of similar
8
language in his home state's sequestration rule."
Why then, ought not Congress rush to amend Rule 615 to include
language similar to that found in the Tennessee rule? Because a Supreme
Court ruling, guided by the principals of statutory interpretation laid out
below, would obviate the need for Congress to engage in the cumbersome
exercise of statutory amendment." 9 Furthermore, a number of circuits
114

The rule states:

At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses, including rebuttal witnesses, excluded at trial or other adjudicatory hearing. In the court's discretion,
the requested sequestration may be effective before voir dire, but in any event
shall be effective before opening statements. The court shall order all persons not
to disclose by any means to excluded witnesses any live trial testimony or exhibits created in the courtroom by a witness. This rule does not authorize exclusion
of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) a person designated by counsel
shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause. This rule
does not forbid testimony of a witness called at the rebuttal stage of a hearing if,
in the court's discretion, counsel is genuinely surprised and demonstrates a need
for rebuttal testimony from an unsequestered witness.
TENN.

R. EvID. 615.
Compare FED R. EvID. 615, with TENN. R.

115

EVID.

615; see also TENN. R. EVID. 615,

Advisory Commission Comment. "If [a sequestration rule] is to be meaningful, witnesses
should not only be instructed to refrain from discussing their courtroom testimony, but
lawyers and others should be instructed not to transmit what witnesses say in court." Id.
116 TENN. R. EVID. 615.
117 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (summarizing disagreement among
circuits as to scope of Rule 615).
18 See Taube, supra note 10 at 200-01. Taube argued that Alabama should include
the following language in its version of Rule 615: "Additionally the court shall order all
persons not to disclose, by any means, to excluded witnesses, any live trial testimony." Id.
119 See infra notes 124-65 and accompanying text (suggesting proper principals of
statutory construction to apply to Federal Rules of evidence).
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have managed to correctly interpret the rule as reaching conduct beyond
the courtroom
without the aid of an express statutory language to that ef1 20
fect.
The specific terms of the Federal Rules of Evidence were not intended to contain answers to every question that may arise in their application. 12 1 Congress implicitly acknowledged that the Rules needed to include
"some play in the joints" in order to address the infinite number of factual
permutations that would inevitably arise in their application. 122 The dynamic nature of the law of evidence defies codification with atomic precision. Rule 102 explains that one of the paramount purposes of the rules is
the "promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained...
V. INTERPRETING FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 615
The introductory material accompanying the Federal Rules of Evidence, which was prepared by the late Professor Edward W. Cleary, suggests that it is appropriate to extend a rule beyond its express provisions in
order to further its purpose.' 24 Although Professor Cleary acknowledged
that courts should accept the plain meaning of the rule's text as the primary
source of its meaning, he cautioned that solely examining the language of
the rule itself can lead to an erroneous interpretation.1 5 He explained that
courts should not interpret the Rules in isolation, but rather
courts should
' 26
relevant."'
be
may
as
context
such
of
light
the
"in
them
read

120

See supra notes 71-113 and accompanying text (discussing circuits that have ex-

tended Rule 615 to reach conduct outside courtroom).
121 See Edward W. Cleary, PreliminaryNotes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57
NEB. L. REv. 908, 908 (1978).
122 Id. Judge Bailey Aldrich of the First Circuit Court of Appeals wrote Professor
Cleary to inquire why the then Proposed Federal Rules of evidence did not expressly recognize the need for there being "some play in the joints" with respect to the interpretation and
application of the rules. Id. Professor Cleary explained that Rule 102, which is captioned
"Purpose and Construction," acknowledges, albeit obliquely, that the text of the rules may
not contain the answers to every issue that arises in their application. Id. Professor Cleary
believed that any express encouragement of judicial creativity incorporated into the rules
was certain to arouse opposition. Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 102. The rule states, "These
rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Id.
123 FED. R. EvID. 102 (entitled "Purpose and Construction").
124 See FED. R. EviD., Introduction at iv.
125 See id. at iii-iv (citing instance where legislative history overrode the "apparently
plain and unmistakable meaning of the words" of Rule 609(a)).
126 See id.

RULE 615: BEYOND COURTROOM PROPER'SWALLS
The so-called plain meaning rule is among the most fundamental
cannons of statutory construction. 127 The rule mandates that "[ifl language
is plain and unambiguous, it must be given effect."' 128 In a similar vein,
' 29
another oft cited canon states that "[a] statute cannot go beyond its text."'
In light of these canons, one can make a colorable argument that the language of Rule 615 plainly requires only the physical exclusion of witnesses
from the courtroom proper, and that courts should not extend the statute
beyond the plain import of its text to reach conduct outside the courtroom.130 One could also marshal the aphorism of construction expression
unius est exclusion
alterius in support the preceding narrow interpretation
3
'
rule.1
the
of
Although Professor Cleary acknowledged the utility of the "plain
meaning rule," he advised that a statute cannot reliably be interpreted on
the basis of its text alone. 132 He explained that if what is meant by the
plain meaning rule "is that meaning is to be ascertained by reading the
statute with aid only of a dictionary and such aphorisms of construction as
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis as may be suitable, then it must be
discarded as unrealistic."'' 33 If the Rules themselves acknowledge that "the
answers to all questions that may arise under the Rules may not be found in
specific terms in the Rules," then any interpretory approach that relies exclusively on the text of the Rules is necessarily deficient.' 34 The Federal
Rules of Evidence must be interpreted with an e e to relevant contexts
such as legislative history and legislative purpose.
Often the most pertinent context will be legislative history, "which
on occasion may even override an apparently plain and unmistakable
meaning of the words of the rule."' 136 For example, the language of Rule
127 See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS, 521-35

(William Hein & Co. 1996) (1960).
128 See id.; see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (giving effect to plain meaning of Mann Act without regard to its manifest purpose).
129 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 127 at 521-35.
130 See supra notes 42-70 and accompanying text (documenting cases refusing to
extend Rule 615 to conduct outside courtroom).
131 See BRIAN A. BLUM, CONTRACTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS, 251 (Aspen Law
& Business 1998). Expressio unius est exclusion alterius is a latin maxim meaning, "The
expression of one thing excludes another." Id.
132 See Cleary, supra note 121 at 911 (stating plain meaning is useful tool, but cautioning statutory language must be contextualized).
133 Id. See also BLUM, supra note 131 at 251. Noscitur a sociis literally means, "from
its associates." Id. This maxim suggests that when terms appear in a series the meaning of
each terms affects the meaning of the others. Id. Ejusdem generic means, "of the same
kind." Id. This maxim instructs that whenever general and specific terms are connected,
the meaning of the general term is governed by the specific one. Id.
134 See Cleary, supra note 121 at 908.
135 See id. at 911-12 (discussing legislative history and legislative purpose as context).
136 FED. R. EVID., introduction at iii.
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609(a)(2) plainly states that convictions for crimes involving "dishonesty"
shall be admitted for impeachment purposes, yet the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that a conviction for attempted burglary does not involve dishonesty. 137 The Court based its holding on the
Conference Committee Report which clearly indicates that robbery is not
among the offenses contemplated as involving dishonesty for Rule 609
purposes. 38 Therefore, this seemingly quixotic interpretation
makes per39
fect sense in light of the rule's legislative backdrop.1
Not all components of a statute's legislative history, however, are of
equal import.' 40 Professor Cleary ranks the relative importance of the various components of legislative history based on their authoritativeness and
availability.' 4' Authoritativeness is a measure of the nexus between a
given legislative material and the enacted statute that follows. 42 Availability is significant in that it helps demarcate and narrow the boundaries of the
inquiry. 43 Expressed more colorfully, "[iun the public interest, how far
should the profession and its menial diggers be expected, or even permitted
to excavate and sift for minute shards of legislative history."' 44 Based on
the criterion of availability and authoritativeness, Professor Cleary ranks
the Rules prescribed by the Supreme Court as the most important component of 45
legislative history with the Advisory Committee's Notes a close
second.1
137

See FED. R. EVID. 609; United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976)

(holding burglary does not involve dishonesty as the term is used in Rule 609).
138 The ieport states:
By the phrase 'dishonesty or false statement,' the Conference means crimes such
as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the
commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 9 (1974).
139See Smith, 551 F.2d at 362 (citing Conference Committee Report); see also H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 9 (1974).
140See infra notes 143-147 and accompanying text (discussing relative importance of
various components of legislative history).
141See Cleary, supra note 121 at 912 (setting forth principal considerations for use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation).
142 See id. According to Cleary, "[a]uthoritativeness concerns the extent to which
given materials reflect the thinking that actually went into the legislation." Id.
143See id. Cleary believed that the less accessible the legislative material, the less
weight one ought to ascribe to it. Id.
144Id.
145 See id. Cleary divided legislative materials into five so-called components,
and he
ranked these components based upon the criteria of authoritativeness and availability. Id.
Listed in descending order of importance, the components are: the Rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee's Notes, Congressional materials, remote materi-

RULE 615: BEYOND COURTROOM PROPER'S WALLS
The legislative history of Rule 615 offers scant guidance as to
whether it was intended to proscribe conduct outside the courtroom. The
Advisory Committee Note does, however, shed some light on the purpose
of the rule. 146 According to the Advisory Committee, the purpose of Rule
47
615 is to discourage and expose fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. 1
Purpose is a second crucial context which courts should consider
when interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. 148 Courts frequently face
the dilemma of deciding the extent to which they ought to extend a rule
beyond the express language of its text. 149 Professor Cleary suggests that
"[tihe answer lies in the purpose of the rule: if the additional situation presents the same problem as that which
the rule was designed to deal, appli150
appropriate."'
is
rule
the
cation of
For example, in United States v. Lewis, 15 1 the Second Circuit extended Rule 801(d)(1)(C) beyond the plain import of its text in order to
further the purpose of the rule. 52 The rule allows an out-of-court statement of identification, which would otherwise be hearsay, to be admitted at
trial if the declarant testifies, is subject to cross-examination, and he or she
made the statement "after perceiving the person."' 53 The express language
of the rule clearly speaks only to instances where the declarant has made a
corporeal identification, yet the court held that photographic identifications
fall within 801(d)(1)(C) as well. 154 The court reasoned that the rule's purpose, permitting "the introduction of identifications made by a witness
when memory was fresher and there had been less opportunity for influence to be exerted," justified its interpretation.155 Moreover, the court
found that the rule's legislative history clearly indicated Congress' intent
that the rule
cover "nonsuggestive photographic" as well as lineup identi56
fications. 1

als, and state resort to federal materials. Id.
146 See FED. R. EVID. 615, Advisory Committee Note (explaining purpose of witness
sequestration).
147
148

See id.

See Cleary, supra note 111. at 916 (discussing importance of purpose in interpreting Federal Rules of Evidence).
149 See FED. R. EVID. introduction at iv.

0 See id.
565 F.2d 1248, 1251-52 (1977) (holding photographic identifications within purview of Rule 801(d)(l)(C)).
152 See id.
153 See FED. R. EVID. Rule 801 (removing certain out-of-court statements from cate151

gory of hearsay).
154 See Lewis, 565 F.2d at 1151-52 (justifying extension of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) beyond
its text).
155 See Lewis, 565 F.2d at 1151-52 (quoting United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983,
996 (2d Cir. 1977)).
156 See Lewis, 565 F.2d at 1151-52; see also S. REP. No. 199, at 2 (1975) (stating Rule
801(d)(1)(C) applies to photographic identifications).
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Similarly, in Kennedy v. GreatAtlantic Tea Co., 57 the Fifth Circuit
looked beyond the plain meaning of Rule 605 in order to interpret it in a
manner consistent with its purpose. 158 On its face Rule 605 only applies to
trial judges. 59 The rule states, "The judge presiding at the trial may not
testify in that trial as a witness."' 6 The Kennedy Court, however, extended
the rule to preclude testimony by the presiding trial judge's clerk.' 6 ' The
court held that the reasons for the rule articulated in the Advisory Committee's Note applied equally as well to the judge's clerk as the judge himself.' 62 For instance, the jury may interpret the clerk's testimony as indicative of the judge's preference for a particular party, or in the case of a
bench trial, the clerk's
involvement certainly has the potential to taint the
63
judge's impartiality. 1
Just as the Lewis court extended Rule 801(d)(1)(C) to include photographic identifications and the Kennedy court extended Rule 605 to forbid testimony by law clerks, the Supreme Court should extend the reach of
Rule 615 beyond the walls of the courtroom. 64 The Court should hold that
any person who exposes a sequestered witness to live trial testimony, in
any form, violates the rule. 65 Although Rule 615's text does not expressly
proscribe such a broad range of conduct, this holding is supported by the
rule's truth-seeking purpose) 66 If the rule is to discourage and expose fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion, it must reach conduct outside the courtroom proper.167

157 551 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1977) (extending Rule 605 to include presiding judge's

clerk).

See id.
159See FED. R. EvID. 605.

158
160

161
162

id.
See Kennedy, 551 F.2d at 597.
See id. (reasoning testimony given by trial judge's clerk presents same dangers as

testimony given by trial judge); see also FED. R. EvID. 605, Advisory Committee Note
(discussing rationale behind rule).
163 See FED. R. EVID. 605, Advisory Committee Note (highlighting potential problems
with trial judge serving as witness). Id. The Advisory Committee Note rhetorically asks,
"Can he be impeached or cross-examined effectively? Can he, in a jury trial, avoid conferring his seal of approval on one side in the eyes of the jury? Can he, in a bench trial, avoid
an involvement destructive of impartiality?" Id.
164See supra notes 148-163 and accompanying text (highlighting role of purpose in
statutory interpretation).
165 See supra notes 114-118 (examining Tennessee version of Rule 615).
166 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Rule 615).
167 See id.

RULE 615: BEYOND COURTROOM PROPER'S WALLS

133

VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should interpret Rule 615 broadly to proscribe conduct outside the courtroom intended to circumvent its purpose. While a number of
courts have, in fact, interpreted the rule as implicitly barring conduct designed to circumvent its purpose, others persist in their obstinate refusal to
extend the rule beyond the "plain meaning" of its text. The drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence cautioned against slavish adherence to the plain
meaning rule, and urged courts to interpret the Rules in light of the crucial
context of purpose. If given the opportunity, the Supreme Court should
interpret Rule 615 broadly in light of its truth-seeking purpose.
Matthew M. Valcourt

